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THE FEMINIST ACADEMIC’S CHALLENGE
TO LEGAL EDUCATION:
CREATING SITES FOR CHANGE
Ann Shalleck
While a few pioneering women legal academics inhabited
law schools and throughout the 20th century sporadically
challenged the pervasive male domination of legal education,
legal feminism did not begin to flourish in law schools until the
1980s. Drawing on broader feminist efforts to transform
academia, feminist law teachers, students, and activists began
questioning not only the content of the material included in the
curriculum that dominated legal education, but also the nature of
scholarly inquiry and analysis, the assumptions underlying
pedagogical methods, the gendered components of the culture
that dominated legal education, and the daily practices that
characterized law schools, both in and out of the classroom.
From these initial efforts to bring the second wave of feminism
into law schools and legal thought, legal feminists generated vast
and enduring change. For more than thirty years, Clare Dalton
contributed to creating a vibrant movement that has sustained
succeeding waves of innovative and diverse forms of feminist
legal thought and pedagogy. These early feminist academics,
such as Clare, challenged prevailing ideas, pervasive norms, and
entrenched structures of power. Often greeted with hostility,
their efforts needed strength, flexibility, and creativity. Clare
Professor of Law and Carrington Shields Scholar, American University,
Washington College of Law. This essay is based on the presentations I and
others made at Challenging Boundaries in Legal Education, A Symposium
Honoring Clare Dalton’s Contributions as a Scholar and Advocate held at
Northeastern University School of Law on November 5, 2010. Many thanks
to Anna-Kristina Fox and Brittany Ericksen who provided expert research
assistance and valuable insight.
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worked with others to develop multiple sites within legal
academia—in scholarship, in teaching, and in curricular design—
where legal academic feminism could flourish. She built upon
and expanded understanding of the gendered nature of law,
deployed forms of critical legal analysis that illuminated the
dynamics of gender within the structures of legal thought,
brought issues that implicated the operation of gender in society
and law into the classroom, and implemented an innovative
model of clinical education that enabled students to act as
lawyers in ways that engaged the experiences of women and
sought to accomplish change.
Clare appeared as an explicitly feminist legal academic early
in this development. When I started the Women and the Law
Program at American University, Washington College of Law in
1984, Clare already appeared to me and to other feminist
academics as an established and respected scholar.1 With so few
women and far fewer feminist professors in this period of rapid
change, when the span of each generation was remarkably short,
we beheld Clare as a senior colleague (although only an
Assistant Professor) who revealed vistas that we had only
incompletely imagined. She identified herself, however, not as
the exceptional woman forging her own distinctive path, but as a
friend akin to us, someone with the courage and confidence to
help us all be stronger in our commitment to and better in our
ability to bring feminist insight and practice to law. Her work,
in its brilliance and originality and its urge to reach across
disciplines and find new ways of understanding gender, was our
work—a project that could undergird and foster our own nascent
efforts. It could help in our resistance to demands and impulses
to replicate dominant models for achieving success within
existing academic terms. With our collective strength,
1

This essay proceeds, as do others in this volume, from an explicitly
situated perspective. Some of us have taken the opportunity presented by this
symposium to reflect upon the history of feminism in legal academia, a
history we were active in creating, through reflection upon Clare Dalton’s
contribution to that history. Therefore, in important respects, this essay
contains certain characteristics of memoir as I (and others) interrogate how
our experiences as participants in these developments influenced the history
of legal education and the history of feminist change.
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determination, and expansive vision, we felt through Clare the
possibility and excitement of transformation.
This essay chronicles Clare’s contributions to the creation of
a feminism that was able to challenge and reconstitute the legal
academy. Part I describes how her ground-breaking approach to
contract theory encouraged others to apply different kinds of
feminist critiques to fundamental assumptions underlying legal
doctrine, expanding the range of feminist critiques of law
beyond many of the initial efforts that often focused on questions
regarding the legal concept and meaning of equality.2 Part II
recounts Clare’s attempts to reform law teaching and the law
school curriculum. While scholarship was a mark of legitimacy
for the legal academic, in the curriculum and teaching practices,
feminist academics had to learn how to have their new legal
understandings take root and gain acceptance in the daily life
and institutional structures of the academy, particularly as
transmitted to students. Through the Women’s Rights and the
Law School Curriculum workshop, Clare and other colleagues
helped to fashion the beginnings of a first-year curriculum that
recognized and even embraced feminist perspectives, including
initiatives such as teaching torts with the recognition of domestic
violence as a fundamental violation of the obligations in
relationships among people. Part III discusses Clare’s efforts to
create institutions within law schools that united feminist theory
and practice. In the founding of the Northeastern University
School of Law’s Domestic Violence Institute, Clare moved from
integrating feminist thought into traditional modes of legal
pedagogy to transforming that pedagogy.
I. BRINGING FEMINISM TO THE CENTER: DECONSTRUCTING
CONTRACT DOCTRINE
During the early 1980s, Clare’s scholarship took on nothing
2

KATHERINE T. BARTLETT & DEBORAH RHODE, GENDER AND LAW:
THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1–3 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining that
gender equality analysis focuses on the premise that individuals should be
treated alike and generates challenges to law based on sex-based
classifications). Formal equality constitutes only one of many feminist legal
theories.
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less than a critique of the basic assumptions underlying contract
doctrine, using critical methodologies still largely unfamiliar to
the legal academy. Her article, An Essay in the Deconstruction
of Contract Doctrine,3 remains a classic to this day, bringing
together methods from different critical traditions in philosophy,
political thought, and literary analysis and drawing on feminist
thought across disciplines.4 Just as she seeks in these traditions
new ways to understand the operation of law and the activity of
legal scholarship, her work reflects her purpose to understand
women as they appear in law and whose lives law shapes. She
explores how women are situated differently in relation to the
materials of the law and to authority in interpretation of law.
The treatment of women in law is at the center of her concerns.
In describing her own goal in engaging in the deconstruction of
doctrine, Clare declares, “my own first commitment is to assess
how women are viewed and treated in legal contexts.”5
To fully appreciate Clare’s contribution, we must situate her
project within the context of the feminism that was beginning to
establish itself within the legal academy and understand those
efforts in light of the powerful resistance that a feminist
presence and feminist legal thought encountered.6 While
academic feminism was growing rapidly in some disciplines
throughout the 1970s, law schools remained largely impervious
or hostile to bringing feminist critical thinking to bear on legal
thought and analysis. The intellectual breadth and sophistication
of Clare’s scholarship reflected and furthered a broad feminist
determination to open up intellectual terrain that could create
space for understanding the relationship of law to gender.
Concomitantly, her intellectual pursuits remained bound up with
her aspiration to make feminist thought central to legal thought.
She situated herself and her writing within the commitments of
feminism.
In her stunningly ambitious project, An Essay in the
3

Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94
YALE L.J. 997 (1985).
4
See id. at 1005–09.
5
Id. at 1009 n.23.
6
Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of
Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1987-88).
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Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, Clare elucidates the
relationships among seemingly discrete intellectual frameworks
for analyzing legal doctrine and legal thought, all of which she
maintained directly and indirectly contributed to the development
of feminist legal thought. She analyzes and critiques contract law
by identifying three central recurring themes—the distinctions
between the public and the private, subjective and objective
understanding, and form and substance—that she argues drive
selected doctrines across the field of contract law. The
distinction between the public and the private becomes her frame
for exploring the structure and development of the concepts of
implied-in-law and quasi-contracts, as well as the doctrines of
duress and unconscionability.7 The dichotomous understanding
of subjective and objective viewpoints guides her analysis of
contract formation, parol evidence, and mistake; in each of those
areas doctrinal devices operate to favor objective over subjective
interpretations of contracts.8 The wavering formulations of
purported explanations of differences between form and
substance propel her analysis of consideration and reliance. As
form devolves into substance, doctrines that concern whether
something has value and how that value is understood resurface
questions of the objectivity of value and the uneasy distinction
between the public and the private.9
In her analysis of these three thematic dichotomies, Clare
brings to bear critical methods and insights that highlight
underlying structures of law. Most explicitly, her title announces
her use of the methods of deconstruction in legal analysis.10
7

In these discrete areas of contract law doctrines, Clare identifies ways
that the dominant conception of contract law as private is subverted by
submerged concerns for the public that appear clearly in justifications for
these seeming “deviations” from the law’s concern for private bargains.
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1001.
8
These devices are seen as a way to disguise how the existence of an
objective way to understand what happens in a bargain is a threat to contract
law’s claim that it is private, not public. Id. at 1001–02.
9
Thus, as in the other areas, arguments about and within these intricate
doctrinal formulations serve to displace questions about the public nature of
seemingly private contract law and the instability of an objective realm of
interpretation in ways that disguise fundamental questions. Id. at 1002.
10
J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J.
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Two aspects of deconstructive techniques appear in her work as
most powerful. First, Clare draws upon analyses of the “role of
conceptual duality” and its hierarchies of inclusion and power in
critiquing contract doctrine.11 She identifies how legal doctrine
attempts both to frame and resolve dualities (such as
public/private, objective/subjective, and form/substance) in
particular legal contexts, by favoring one pole of the duality over
the other. The constructed dualities create forms of legal
argumentation that, while seeming to generate determinate
answers, actually disguise underlying problems of power and
knowledge. This process submerges contradictions and
inconsistencies in the creation of the duality in an attempt both to
achieve stability for law and to disguise how the privileging of
one pole can generate benefits for some at the expense of others.
Second, the creation of the duality involves circularity. Clare
shows that while each pole relies on the other for its meaning and
each is unrecognizable without the other, law attempts through its
doctrines to separate the opposing concepts from each other. The
law treats one concept as fundamental or foundational and the
other as secondary or supplemental to the first. Arguments within
intricate doctrinal formulations serve to displace, and therefore to
disguise, questions about the very nature of the duality, its
hierarchical structure, and the questions it presents.12
743 (1987) (identifying methodological techniques and philosophical ideas
from deconstruction that can illuminate how legal doctrines are formed and
influenced by ideological thinking).
11
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1007. Dalton analyzes how the “hierarchal
relationship between the poles” of a duality produces a disfavored pole.
While Dalton draws most explicitly on the work of Derrida and
deconstructive methodologies within post-structuralism, a related strand of
feminist thought goes back to Simone de Beauvoir. In the introduction to The
Second Sex, de Beauvoir identifies her analysis of women’s situation as
rooted in the operation of the duality of masculine and feminine: “[N]o group
ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over
against itself . . . . The Other is posed as such by the One in defining himself
as the One. But if the Other is not to regain the status of being the One, he
must be submissive enough to accept this alien point of view. Whence comes
this submission in the case of woman?” SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND
SEX, at xvii–xviii (H. M. Parshley trans. 1952) (1949).
12
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1000–01, 1007–08. For example, in creating
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Clare also draws upon other critical traditions in her
analysis of three dichotomies that recur in contract law. She
argues that liberal legalism—which posits abstract universal
legal subjects who can freely interact with others without state
interference, except that which protects them from the
overreaching of others—also disguises what is at stake in the
dichotomies between public and private, subjective and
objective understanding, and form and substance. By
constructing contract doctrines that assume the abstract
universal legal subject in the creation of the lines that
demarcate the boundaries between the poles of each duality,
contract law disguises the structures of power that underlie the
lives of the actual people implicated in each particular doctrinal
formulation.13 In exploring her three thematic dualities, Clare
shows how the doctrines reflect liberal legalism’s vision of the
relationship of the individual to others and to the state, while
also presenting forms of argumentation that legitimate
underlying structures of power that allocate benefits within
society. By revealing the underlying understandings of
individuals, assumptions about their relationships to each other
and to the state, and the forms of power disguised within
doctrinal formulations and analysis, Clare provides academics
and advocates with “a most sophisticated sense both of the
array of available argument and of the limits of legal
discourse.”14
While other schools of legal critique, most notably legal
realism, had long assaulted the orthodoxy of classical legal
thought, none embraced the insights of the second wave of

a duality between the public and the private, and in valuing the private over
the public in contract law, doctrines seek to make the private the norm and
the public the deviation from, or the supplement to, the private. If questions
about the actual public nature of seemingly private contract law become
questions about the precise contours of specific doctrines such as
unconscionability, then doctrinal formulations maintain the stability of the
idea that contracts are private and disguise how fundamental questions of
fairness are marginal to the interpretation of contracts.
13
Id. at 1007.
14
Id. at 1009.
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feminist thought that emerged and matured outside law.15 Clare,
however, integrates multiple forms of emergent feminist thought
with other critical traditions. Her thematic analysis of the
dichotomies of contract doctrines and her challenge to the
abstract legal subjects who appear in the resulting doctrinal
formulations present a feminist approach to confronting any area
of legal doctrine. In critiquing “liberal political theory and legal
liberalism,”16 Clare demonstrates how liberal legal thought posits
a universal (rather than particular) and abstract (as opposed to
contextualized) vision of individuals and relationships and,
thereby, evades the conversation about “how we should conceive
relationships between people” and “how we should understand
and police the boundary between self and other.”17 Her critique,
which reflects the feminist discomfort with the abstract, isolated
individual as the central figure in liberal legal thought,18 calls for
careful and sustained attention in each doctrinal area to the
“concrete aspects of social life.”19 Further, Clare highlights how
the abstraction disguises “how a legal order . . . can still operate
to exclude important constituencies from the benefits available
within the society.”20 This exclusion makes the experiences of
women, however situated, invisible or indistinguishable from
those of men even when social reality makes the differences in
experiences critical to understanding how law does and could
operate. Abstract doctrines, when applied in particular legal and
social contexts, distort understanding of women’s participation in
society or work to exclude them from crucial spheres of life.
15

Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J.
493, 500–08 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
16
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1005–06.
17
Id. at 1006.
18
For example, while many legal feminists criticized law for treating
individuals differently based on their gender, other feminists questioned the
limits of an equality analysis that could not reach structural inequalities
between men and women. Debates about formal equality versus substantive
equality and multiple efforts to transcend the debate dominated much feminist
legal theory of this period. See Dalton, supra note 6.
19
Dalton, supra note 3, at 1001–03.
20
Id. at 1007.
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In the task of deconstruction, Clare also makes feminist
insight central.21 The themes she chooses for organizing her
process of deconstructing contract doctrine permeated the
resurgent second wave of feminism thought within which Clare
wrote. Two paradigmatic examples from different disciplines
illustrate how Clare’s study of contract law reflected
developments altering vast fields of inquiry and drew upon
methods of analysis and themes that appear in the path-breaking
work of others. In philosophy, Simone de Beauvoir’s pioneering
work, The Second Sex, analyzed women’s experience through
the hierarchal duality of man/woman.22 In history, feminist
historians explored the development of separate spheres ideology
in the nineteenth century, revealing ways of thinking and
structures relationships that marked off the public from the
private and treated women’s feelings as distinct from men’s
knowledge.23 Clare’s thematic choices reflect the feminist
consciousness of the time and contributed to its expansion into
legal academia.
In addition, the article brings a distinctive technique to the
methodology of deconstruction: while her deconstructive
methods draw upon the work of Derrida, her accounts of
binaries within law take the form of stories.24 This mode of
analysis reflects the emergent feminist focus on storytelling that
crossed disciplinary boundaries. Clare describes her scholarly
deconstructive project as reshaping the telling of law’s stories.
She begins her article with an invocation of this project: “[l]aw,
21

Id. at 1009 n.23 (“[W]hen it comes to looking behind and beyond
doctrine to ask what is perpetrated through it, my own first commitment is to
assess how women are viewed and treated in legal context.”).
22
DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 11.
23
For an example of such work, see generally CAROL SMITHROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA (1984).
24
In explaining how Derrida’s metaphysical concerns can be translated
into law, Jack Balkin credits Dalton with developing the metaphor of
storytelling to explain how binaries work in law: “Law tells a story about
what people are and should be.” Balkin, supra note 10, at 762. The binaries
of public and private, objective and subjective, and form and substance
appear not just as doctrinal rules but as stories about how law works to
explain and order people’s behavior and relationships.
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like every other cultural institution, is a place where we tell
one another stories about our relationships with ourselves, one
another, and authority.”25 In pursuing this project of
deconstructing contract law, she demonstrates how analyzing
stories within and about legal discourse can “expose the way
law shapes all stories into particular patterns of telling, favors
certain stories and disfavors others, or even makes it
impossible to tell certain kinds of stories.”26 In order to build
feminism into the legal academy in a way that could be deep
and integral, she shows how feminists can reveal hidden or
displaced stories and tell new stories as ways of challenging
those that dominate. For example, in telling how doctrines
implicate the stories of relationships and not just discrete,
atomized individuals, feminists can resuscitate buried accounts
and construct new narratives that expose unrealized aspects or
consequences of a particular doctrinal formulation. Through
telling and retelling, critique and re-interpretation of law’s
stories, and the revelation of stories hidden behind the stylized
process of storytelling in legal discourse, Clare and other
feminist legal academics sought to reshape through scholarship
the meaning and experience of law. Further, recognizing that
“those who dominate the legal forum only incompletely dictate
the range of legitimate stories,” Clare takes from feminism the
imperative of finding and creating “room for those who speak
in a different voice and who can use that voice to critique the
dominant one.”27
To pull all these feminist strands together, Clare concludes
with analysis of the doctrines implicated in the enforcement of
cohabitation agreements between unmarried people. Using the
understanding developed in the article of the doctrines of express
and implied contract, manifestation and intent, and consideration
and reliance, she shows how courts achieve a supposed
resolution of arguments about how to treat these agreements.
Her methodology applied in this setting of a particular kind of
relationship reveals how, in the doctrinal treatment of
25
26
27

Dalton, supra note 3, at 999.
Id.
Id. at 999 n.3.
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cohabitation agreements, the creation and structuring of the
dichotomies of public and private, objective and subjective
understanding, and form and substance serve to displace
underlying issues about the actual relationships, the interactions of
unmarried people who enter cohabitation agreement, and the
stance of the state toward those agreements and those people. To
escape from “the stranglehold” of these doctrinal arguments “on
our thinking about concrete contractual issues,”28 Clare “bring[s]
to life the underlying issues of power and knowledge that lie
buried in the doctrine by focusing on the images of women and of
human relationship that the doctrine presupposes.”29 Clare
constructs intellectual paths to generate analysis and debate about
“commitments and concerns central to our society” that are
pervasive in doctrine but that doctrinal discourse keeps at a
“stylized distance.”30 In “decoding the doctrinal formulations,”
she fosters understanding about the real stakes for real people.
She aims to present possibilities not just for critique of those
particular doctrines, but for reimagining how law might be
recast.31
It is clear in retrospect that feminist legal scholarship across
many different theoretical orientations and in many different
areas of substantive law has grappled with these concerns—
regarding the connection between self and others, the
distribution and operation of power, and the exclusion of women
from or their marginalization in aspects of social life—that Clare
articulated at a moment when feminist thought was transforming
the academy generally, yet only beginning to challenge
entrenched ways of analyzing law.32 It is also apparent that
28

Id. at 1095 (“By ordering the ways in which we perceive disputes,
these [doctrinal] arguments blind us to some aspects of what the disputes are
actually about. By helping us categorize, they encourage us to simplify in a
way that denies the complexity, and ambiguity, of human relationships. By
offering us the false hope of definitive resolution, they allow us to escape the
pain, and promise, of continual reassessment and accommodation.”).
29
Id. at 1003.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 1009.
32
The textbooks on feminist legal theory, many of which have gone
through multiple editions, provide an entry point into this now vast
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Clare’s identification of these questions as central to feminist
legal thought—although they differed from the more readily
available issues concerning equality33—generated and sustained
further innovative inquiry.34 This work has extended feminist
legal critique in ways seemingly remote from particular contract
doctrines or discrete areas of law and expanded feminist legal
analysis to create new ways to explore the interplay of law with
the operation of gender. With Clare’s innovative work on
contract doctrine, we were all better able to confront the weight
of authority that appeared arrayed to resist challenges. With her
concepts, approaches, and analysis, we proceeded with her as
an ally in our minds and in our hearts.
This iconic article coupled with Clare’s other scholarship did
not secure tenure for her at Harvard,35 just as extraordinary
achievement has often failed to bring rewards “that would in all
probability have fallen to the lot of equally determined and
qualified men”;36 however, it achieved a different sort of success
in feminist terms. It played a central role in securing for
feminism a powerful and explicit presence in legal scholarship,
literature.
33
Much early feminist legal thought, influenced by distinguished
advocates, approached law as the site of inequality and the site for remedying
that inequality. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s now renowned work as a
lawyer litigating the pioneering cases challenging sex-based classifications as
part of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project and as a law teacher is only the
most widely known and influential example of this strand of early feminist
thought. Other early feminist legal advocates and academics, along with
Clare, developed other feminist approaches. See Dalton, supra note 6.
34
As feminists grappled with dilemmas around the treatment of
pregnancy in anti-discrimination law and generated new approaches in
feminist thought in the equality debates, feminist legal academics have found
ways to continue to create new forms of analysis for critiquing how gender
differences in caring for others and in household responsibilities can
contribute to exclusion from social and political life or to economic
vulnerability. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES (1995).
35
Patti Doten, The Law Professor Who Sued Harvard Tells Why the
Stack is Decked Against Women, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1993, at 36.
36
Clare Dalton, How It Was, How It Is, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1346, 1346
(1988).
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fostered new forms of feminist legal analysis, prompted
recognition and respect that have endured the continually
changing scholarly landscape, and became a source for critical
legal thought up to the present.37 Feminists across disciplines
have drawn upon it,38 traditional legal scholars have had to

37

A quick citation check on Lexis reveals 370 citation references across
legal fields, not to mention citations in many secondary sources and reprints
in various collections. In 1996, it was listed as a most cited law review
article of recent years. Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles
Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 774 tbl.2 (1996).
38
See, e.g., Susanne Baer, A Different Approach to Jurisprudence?
Feminisms in German Legal Science, Legal Cultures, and the Ambivalence of
Law, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 251, 282–83 n.135 (1996); Katharine T.
Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 835 n.18 (1990)
[hereinafter Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods]; Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender
Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 13 n.64, 14 n.71 (1994); Dan L.
Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER
SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 184 n.4 (2007); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice
Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV.
1599, 1624 n.95 (1991) [hereinafter Theory-Practice Spiral]; Beverly
Horsburgh, Decent and Indecent Proposals in the Law: Reflections on
Opening the Contracts Discourse to Include Outsiders, 1 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 57 (1994) (arguing that the contracts curriculum disadvantages
law students by its insistence on total objectivity and a separateness from the
culture in which it is situated and applying Dalton’s analysis to understanding
how a partial or subjective view gets presented as universal); Christine A.
Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1283
n.24, 1322 n.225 (1987); Ramona L. Paetzold, Commentary: Feminism and
Business Law: The Essential Interconnection, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 699, 713
n.51 (1994) (applying Dalton’s analysis to a feminist critique of commercial
law, arguing that her analysis of the public/private duality is helpful in
deconstructing various doctrines and the analysis of the objective/subjective
duality reveals how questions of power dynamics get obscured); Kellye Y.
Testy, An Unlikely Resurrection, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 219 (1995) (applying
Dalton’s analysis of contract law to lesbian legal theory, arguing that lesbians
should seek to use contract rather than be used by it, by confronting the
ambivalence and dualities).
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acknowledge it39—even if critical of it—and scholars from other
critical traditions have relied on it.40
II. TELLING STORIES IN CLASS: FEMINISM IN THE LAW SCHOOL
CURRICULUM
Clare’s work and the work of feminist legal academics
transformed not only legal scholarship, although that
transformation was necessary for feminism to survive and
flourish in the legal academy. Were academic legal feminism
confined to legal scholarship, however important scholarship
39

See, e.g., Donald F. Brosnan, Serious But Not Critical, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 259 (1987) (criticizing Dalton’s use of deconstruction as inconclusive
and as failing to provide guidance on how to construct rules that better
organize private obligations); Joel R. Cornwell, Legal Writing as a Kind of
Philosophy, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1091 (1997) (applying Dalton’s analysis to
the legal writing curriculum in arguing that the standard models of legal
writing promote a disjunction between writing and thought); Chad
McCracken, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEX. L. REV.
719, 749 (1999) (in arguing for the autonomy of contract law, discusses
Dalton’s description of the tension between objective and subjective theories
of contract law in relationship to the dialectic between individual and
community in Hegel); Sky Pettey, Power and Knowledge in Agreements to
Arbitrate Statutory Employment Rights, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 927
(1999) (using the treatment of power and knowledge in Dalton’s dichotomies
to analyze the arbitrariness of courts’ preferences for arbitration clauses);
Charles E. Rounds, Jr., The Common Law Is Not Just About Contracts: How
Legal Education Has Been Short-Changing Feminism, 43 U. RICH. L. REV.
1185 (2009) (extending Dalton’s analysis of quasi-contract to the concepts of
agency and trust as reflective of the ways equity’s private fiduciary
relationships can address power and knowledge imbalances); Kenneth L.
Schneyer, The Culture of Risk: Deconstructing Mutual Mistake, 34 AM. BUS.
L.J. 429 (1997) (applying Dalton’s methodology to the notion of mistake in
contract doctrine and emphasizing the role of binaries in the development of
mutual mistake).
40
See, e.g., Mark Kelman, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 25,
104–06 (1987); Balkin, supra note 10; Robert Batey, Alienation by Contract
in Paris Trout, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 289 (1994) (using questions posed by
Dalton regarding the relationship between self and other to analyze the
potential for alienation in the individualist bias of most modern conceptions
of contract law that tends to overemphasize the threat posed by others and
undervalue the promise of solidarity with them).
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may be to educational institutions, it would have been little more
than a bump in intellectual history. For feminism to alter the
legal academy and thereby reshape understanding in the legal
profession and in society, new understandings of law could not
remain cabined in the realm of scholarly production; scholarly
work had to be instantiated as curricular change.
Having embraced the task of reframing the narratives of law
in her own scholarly writing, Clare enthusiastically joined the
feminist effort to reconstitute the storytelling that pervades legal
education. Through an engaged legal education, feminist
academics could pass on to their students an understanding of
how law’s stories relate to the lives of women and to the core
concerns of all people, concerns that demand the inclusion of
women. Feminist thought had to be incorporated into the law
school curriculum—not just as separate “women and the law”
courses, but as part of the full range of law’s stories as they
emerge in different courses throughout the curriculum.41 In
1984, the Women and the Law Program at American
University, Washington College of Law42 set out to build
connections among feminists and others critical of dominant
forms of legal education who often worked in isolation at their
institutions. They sought to facilitate change in what was taught
in classrooms and how it was taught, and, at deeper structural
levels, to influence the structure and content of the curriculum.43
41

Dalton, supra note 36.
The creation of the Women and the Law Program by the faculty of the
Washington College of Law emerged from a rediscovery of the story of our
founding in 1896 by two women, Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillett
who began the only law school in the United States founded by women. Ann
Shalleck, Report of the Women and the Law Project: Gender Bias and the
Law School Curriculum, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 97, 97 (1988). For full accounts
of this history, see Mary L. Clark, The Founding of the Washington College
of Law: The First Law School Established by Women for Women, 47 AM. U.
L. REV. 613, 614 (1998); VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW:
WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY (2001).
43
The seeds of this current symposium honoring Clare Dalton were sown
at the 1985 program. Feminist academics that preceded me and participated
in this symposium were essential to conceptualizing and creating the
workshop on Women’s Rights and the Law School Curriculum, most notably
Elizabeth Schneider. Conversations with Liz helped produce this project, and
42
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In 1985, the Women and the Law Program instituted an
annual workshop called Women’s Rights and the Law School
Curriculum, coordinated with the annual meetings of the
Association of American Law Schools, designed to create a
regularized yet distinctive feminist presence broadly accessible
to interested faculty.44 The program continued for the remainder
of the century.45 Clare was an enthusiastic and committed
participant from the beginning. The first workshop “focused on
those courses devoted primarily to examining the legal status of

Liz, already with significant experience in creating feminist change in
practice and in legal academia, guided me into the existing academic feminist
network. See Elizabeth M. Schneider & Cheryl Hanna, The Development of
Domestic Violence as a Legal Field: Honoring Clare Dalton, 20 J.L. &
POL’Y 343 (2012). At the 1985 workshop, my own academic work
intersected with that of Clare, whom this symposium honors. Other
academics from the 1985 program are participants in this symposium.
44
Shalleck, supra note 42, at 98–99. The relationship to the AALS
Annual Meetings changed over time as the format and structure of those
meetings changed. For example, in the early years, the Women and the Law
Program could be considered to be an allied organization and its workshop
was treated as part of the programming done by those organizations. In 1986,
the workshop presented by the Women and the Law Program was actually
one of the AALS’s Mini-Workshops. Later, with changes in the format of the
annual meetings, the Women and the Law Program’s annual workshops could
not have these official or quasi-official designations, but, to facilitate
participation, coordination of the workshops with the official meeting
activities continued.
45
Around this time, the AALS Annual Meeting had expanded in scope,
including extended programming involving full-day workshops at the
beginning of the meeting. It became increasingly difficult for those attending
the meeting to participate in supplementary programming as the annual
meeting itself became more extensive. In addition, as more women entered
law teaching, the AALS Section on Women in Legal Education became
increasingly active in developing its own programming on gender and the
law. A specialized focus on feminism within the law school curriculum
remains important as resistance to feminist theory and to a curriculum that
fully incorporates theoretical, doctrinal, and clinical feminist teaching
remains. Particularly as legal education goes through critical changes,
sustaining efforts to retain feminist thought and practice as part of legal
education takes on new meaning. However, the particular institutional
structure for creating a setting for these discussions must be different.
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women”46—partly because feminists had first claimed a presence
in legal academia through demands, primarily by women
students, for these courses47 and partly because these courses
served as a base for many feminists within academia. By 1985,
such women and the law courses had already served many
purposes, among them operating as outposts for feminist
thinking within the curriculum.48 From this starting point, the
Women and the Law Program, with the second workshop the
following year, began in earnest to expand feminist thinking into
all aspects of law and law teaching and, therefore, into all parts
of the curriculum.49
Moving from specialized courses often on the margins to the
core of legal education, the second workshop concentrated on
the first-year curriculum. As the announcement for the second
workshop declared, “[i]ssues affecting women permeate the law
but are often invisible in the law school curriculum outside of
specialized courses in women and the law.”50 It then marked as
an historical phenomenon the efforts of those “who have begun
to integrate this work into many courses throughout the
curriculum.”51 The first-year curriculum, in the content of its
courses and its methods of instruction, worked to signal what
mattered to the development of students’ understanding of law
and their ways of thinking about it. “Because the first year
curriculum is basic to shaping a shared understanding throughout
the legal profession of what the law is and how it operates, the
program will focus on attempts to include issues about women in
46

Program Announcement, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., Mini-Workshop:
Women’s Rights and the Law School Curriculum (Jan. 4, 1986) (on file with
author).
47
See Dalton, supra note 6, at 3–5.
48
Id.
49
The yearly workshop served not only as a space to share and develop
ideas and to learn from others engaged in similar efforts, but also as a site
for creating change. The number of women law teachers, while growing
quickly during a period of expansion of legal education, remained relatively
small, and feminists were a far smaller group. Situating feminist thinking in
the curriculum, whether in specialized courses or embedded in other
courses,, was a contested enterprise.
50
Program Announcement, supra note 46.
51
Id.
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three standard first year courses: property, contracts, and
torts.”52
This early effort at addressing the exclusion of any explicit
examination of the operation of gender at this formative point in
students’ education involved asking basic questions and creating
a broad dialogue among participants: Why did an exploration of
gender matter in legal study? How did such inquiries affect
students’ understanding of these areas of law? What goals did
feminist law teachers seek to achieve in making change? What
change was possible within the constraints of a standard firstyear curriculum? What methods were available? What challenges
did people face? What risks did they invite? This workshop
created a space for framing and facing these basic questions and
began an ongoing endeavor to explore how feminist thought
could affect the approach to the most basic of law school’s
material.
In light of Clare’s scholarly work, this workshop precisely
suited her knowledge and her commitments. Along with
Deborah Rhode and Patricia Williams, Clare led the discussion
on contracts. In a letter following the workshop, she described
the meaning of the workshop for her:
For myself, it was nothing short of thrilling to sit down
with a group of people teaching in the contracts field,
and compare notes and exchange suggestions about how
to enrich our courses through a more concrete
recognition of the women who are our students, and the
women’s issues that for one reason and another have
been left out of the traditional curriculum.53
Consistent with her conviction that focusing on women
illuminates questions regarding the most deeply embedded
assumptions in law and the most basic ways of framing doctrinal
questions, Clare was particularly drawn to how this project can
“provide many more points of access to central questions about
the role law plays in our society.”54 Clare also cautioned: “[n]ow
the question will be whether we can collectively sustain our
52
53
54

Id.
Id.
Id.
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commitment to the project and move forward.”55 The Women
and the Law Program provided the “supporting and steering
function”56 that aggregated the work of individuals into a
collective project so that feminist law professors could achieve
more than discrete and idiosyncratic victories. With this 1986
workshop, the Women and the Law Program took a critical,
albeit initial, step of “bringing us into touch with each other.”57
To incorporate feminist ideals into the first-year curriculum,
feminist academics needed to develop teaching materials that at
least acknowledged, even if they did not fully embrace, the
emergence of feminist approaches to and insights about legal
thought. While a textbook with women’s names on the cover did
not guarantee feminist perspectives, the near exclusion of
women from authorship of the central materials shaping the
story of the law that first-year students encountered revealed the
daunting project of challenging legal education that feminists
faced. At that time, with rare exceptions,58 major casebooks in
first-year subjects did not include women authors. The three
fields of contracts, torts, and property on which the workshop
focused had no women authors. In addition, whoever the
authors, no texts included explicitly feminist perspectives nor
offered the feminist critiques emerging in the literature of law
journals. Feminist academics knew that if in first-year
classrooms only feminist law professors told counter-stories of
the law that contained women’s experiences, ones that operated
as narratives of resistance to the text, they and their accounts
would be discounted as partial, biased, marginal—or at best
subsidiary.
Just as feminists had to publish their legal theories in law
reviews, they also needed to appear in the authoritative material
of the texts presented to students as embodying the corpus of the
law, particularly the texts of first-year courses, which appeared
as the most fundamental. The narrative of law told through the
55

Id.
Id.
57
Id.
58
See, e.g., BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & PAUL D. CARRINGTON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTS ON THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (2d
ed. 1977).
56
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text needed to encompass feminist thought. Only with concerted
effort would this domain, just as that of scholarly writing, allow
entry to subversive accounts. Just as the academy viewed
Clare’s scholarship with suspicion, feminists who challenged the
standard presentation of material in the first year risked skeptical
responses from colleagues and students. Clare and other
feminists promoted exchange and experimentation that could
produce different materials. Over time these efforts could yield
fully developed texts. Clare saw that the Women and the Law
Program could help feminist academics “develop materials for
our own and others’ use” and explore when and how they might
“supplement a traditional casebook,” or, at some later time,
“provide a complete substitute.”59
While the first-year curriculum continued as a focus of the
Women and the Law Program through its annual workshops, the
program also pursued other entry points into the law school
curriculum, identifying those that at this point in history
appeared amenable to change. While the established
curriculum’s weight and solidity were formidable, women
students were flooding into law schools after years of
exclusion.60 Many of these students had the capacity and
motivation “to exert some political muscle on behalf of other
women, if they will,”61 and they had at their disposal the
“growing body of empirical research into gender issues, and the
growing body of formal and informal feminist and gender
theory.”62 These factors aligned to create the potential “that
professional cultures themselves will begin to change in ways
responsive to women’s perspectives and experiences.”63 But
these developments created only the possibility of change. The
Women and the Law Program worked consistently with feminist
legal academics to identify and foster strategies for creating a
59

Letter from Clare Dalton, Professor of Law, Northeastern University
School of Law, to author (Feb. 10, 1986) (on file with author).
60
Dalton, supra note 36, at 1355 (citing Miriam Slater & Penina Migdal
Glazer, Prescriptions for Professional Survival, DAEDALUS, Fall 1987, at
119, 132).
61
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62
Id.
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different curriculum. As Clare stated, “[w]omen too solitary to
count on the support of other women, women too nervous about
their vulnerabilities as women to take the risk involved in
identifying politically with other women, will find it difficult to
provide that guidance.”64 As the workshops continued to explore
multiple facets of feminist work in the curriculum, participants
found support and guidance in this collective project.
After Harvard denied Clare tenure and she won a significant
settlement in her sex-discrimination lawsuit,65 she moved to
Northeastern where she expanded and broadened her efforts to
transform the law school curriculum. She continued to integrate
these efforts into the collective work of the Women and the Law
Program. In 1992, at the sixth annual workshop on Women’s
Rights and the Law School Curriculum, Teaching about the
Battering of Women: Women’s Experiences, Legal Responses
and the Educational Project,66 Clare discussed two broad efforts
among colleagues to change first-year stories of law that
appeared in the curriculum: designing a torts class around
domestic violence issues and using domestic violence to teach
various subjects.67 As in her previous work, she looked to
experiences shared among many women, the experiences of
domestic violence, as part of the material for the new stories in
the first year. Clare and her colleagues grounded both projects
to change the traditional narratives of the first year in the
dynamics of relationships that affected the lives of many women
in many ways.
The choice of this topic related to Clare’s work on founding
and shaping the Domestic Violence Institute at Northeastern.68
64

Id.
Deborah L. Rhode, Litigating Discrimination: Lessons from the Front
Lines, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 340–41 (2012).
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Program Announcement, Ass’n of Am. Law Sch., Mini-Workshop:
Teaching about the Battering of Women: Women’s Experiences, Legal
Responses and the Educational Project (Jan. 6, 1992) (on file with author).
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Other presenters were Elizabeth Schneider and Margaret Mahoney. Id.
68
As part of the settlement of her sex discrimination lawsuit against
Harvard, at the center of which was her article, Clare obtained Harvard’s
funding for the Domestic Violence Institute. Alice Dembner, Harvard Law
Ends Bias Suit by Agreeing on Institute, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 22, 1993,
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Addressing domestic violence throughout the different subjects
of the first year and within various doctrinal formulations
exposed how discrete legal categories inadequately contain the
multiple aspects of people’s experience and relationships—a
project fundamental to all Clare’s work. Clare and her
colleagues proceeded with complementary strategies: the first
made the social reality of domestic violence central to the
exploration of several doctrinal categories throughout all the
sections of the basic torts class; the second used domestic
violence as a topic for analysis across different subjects—
criminal law, torts, and contract law, for example—that
routinely compartmentalize people’s experiences and students’
understanding of how law works in discrete neat packages.
In the first project, the redesign of the torts course reflected
how feminist principles can begin to transform the culture of
legal education. In shaping the course, Clare and her colleagues
did not want to make domestic violence merely an interesting,
even gripping, example of a doctrinal point; feminists in law
schools had long criticized the exploitation in texts and in
classroom hypotheticals of scenarios in which women suffer
profound harm. To avoid treating domestic violence as just a
random, convenient topic or sensationalizing violence against
women, the torts faculty adopted several approaches. First, in
the torts class, discussion of domestic violence recurred within
three doctrinal areas: the no-duty rule in negligence, self-defense
rules in intentional torts, and immunity rules within the context
of governmental action and within the family. Faculty connected
the exploration in each doctrinal area to the others, showing how
themes, such as the public/private distinction, appeared across
doctrines and were used to justify doctrinal resolutions. Second,
exploration of the issues implicated in situations of domestic
violence went beyond doctrinal or policy debates. Classes
explored the social contexts within which domestic violence
occurs and the different meanings it has, the systemic issues that
affect the legal treatment of domestic violence, and the work of
advocates in devising legal strategies to address both systemic
failures and harm to individuals. Third, professors presented
(Metro), at 11.
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issues of battering not only through legal texts, but also with
materials that could make social contexts meaningful in
understanding the interaction of the legal world and the social
world.69
With this careful structure in place, Clare and her colleagues
also developed teaching methods that reflected the messages they
sought to convey. For example, they made the interactions
among the students in the class central to the teaching mission
and the teaching design. Knowing that “many students in the
room . . . had violence touch their lives,” faculty “design[ed]
experiences at the beginning of the year that alert[ed] students to
the issues that [would] arise in class.”70 In addition, they
anticipated and planned ways to structure classroom discussions
that acknowledged “the presence and the power of the anger
evoked” in the discussions, while including discussion of the
harm to men as well as women when battering occurs.71 To
include students’ experiences and feelings in the pedagogy of the
class was to acknowledge how lawyers are connected to the law
they practice and students are connected to the material they
learn. People in cases are not abstract legal subjects, and
lawyers are not abstract legal advocates. As Clare sought to
displace the autonomous, objective legal subject at the center of
liberal legal thought, she and her colleagues devised ways to
reconstruct the law school classroom with students and their
experiences central to the educational inquiry.
In the second project, all professors in first-year courses
collaborated to devote a day to domestic violence, demonstrating
that issues of domestic violence transcend subject matter, with
69

Social science literature about domestic violence, descriptions of how
courts treat different kinds of cases involving domestic violence, and personal
narratives of attempts to use the legal system in situations involving battering
are examples of the types of materials that provided critical context for
considering and assessing how legal doctrine frames and resolves complex
aspects of social life.
70
Women and the Law Project’s Discussion Group at the 1992 AALS
Annual Meeting, AALS WOMEN & L. SEC. NEWSL. (Am. Ass’n of Law Sch.,
Wash., D.C.), Apr. 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Women and the Law Project’s
Discussion Group].
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each subject area limited in its capacity to address the complex
social reality of partner abuse. This project, like Clare’s work
on contract doctrine,72 critiqued how legal structures constrict
fundamental questions of self-definition and of relationships, but
situated that analysis within a particular, pervasive, deeply
troubling part of the social world and placed it at the center of
inquiry in the first-year curriculum. The faculty devised small
group exercises that enabled students to participate in activities
through which they could, at least in the constrained and
artificially limited setting of a simulation, experience aspects of
the real-world meaning and consequences of the legal stories
about domestic violence.
The power of Clare’s account at the 1992 workshop came
only partially from the particular initiatives she described.
Rather, the workshop wove together her experiments in change
with the compelling stories of other feminist academics working
to create new forms of legal education through sustained,
contextualized treatment of this one aspect of women’s
experience. The multiple accounts of disrupting the standard
format of law school classes expanded the imaginations of law
teachers about manageable, effective ways to bring feminist
thought and teaching into the curriculum and increased
confidence and desire to undertake similar experiments.73
Perhaps the greatest tribute to Clare’s work at the site of law
school teaching and curriculum is that pedagogical practices such
as hers and those of the other feminist academics who joined in
the annual workshops on Women’s Rights and the Law School
curriculum now seem normal, regular parts of an expanded
74
vision of legal education. Specialized courses abound, even if
not evenly distributed across law schools.75 Many upper-level
76
77
offerings and clinical courses routinely give serious attention
72

See Dalton, supra note 3, at 999–1000.
Women and the Law Project’s Discussion Group, supra note 70.
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Examples of these teaching innovations have been presented at
Professional Development Programs of the AALS.
75
For example, Women and the Law, Sex-Based Discrimination,
Feminist Jurisprudence, Battered Women and the Law, and Reproductive
Rights appear with some frequency across legal education.
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to gender, and courses examining a range of critical theories
include feminist analyses.78 At the same time, feminism has not
swept away dominant structures and forms of thought from legal
education. These remain, but less firmly in place and more
susceptible to critique and reconstruction than when Clare
entered legal academia more than thirty years ago.
III. CREATING THE NORTHEASTERN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
INSTITUTE
Clare’s move to Northeastern and the monetary settlement
she obtained in her claim against Harvard79 afforded her another
opportunity to transform law and legal education through
feminist thought and action. Supported partially by the Harvard
funds, Clare worked with others, most notably Lois Kanter, to
establish the Northeastern Domestic Violence Institute.80 The
Institute was a feminist clinical program at the intersection of the
immigration, civil rights, human rights, criminal law, and family law address
issues involving analysis of gender.
77
For example, specialized clinics in women and the law, domestic
violence, and sex discrimination appear regularly among a law school’s
clinical offerings. Clinics addressing lawyering across many spheres of law
and practice—whether through specialized focus on areas such as
immigration, human rights, tax, intellectual property, or disability rights or
through general approaches to lawyering, such as civil practice, community
lawyering, or community economic development—often give substantial
attention to questions of law and practice that pose issues related to gender,
race, inequality, and multiple forms of exclusion. See generally Margaret
Johnson, An Experiment in Integrating Critical Theory and Clinical
Education, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 161 (2005).
78
For example, courses in critical race theory or sexuality and law
routinely explore how gender operates in conjunction with other structures of
exclusion, discrimination, and subordination.
79
See Leigh Goodmark, Clinical Cognitive Dissonance: The Values and
Goals of Domestic Violence Clinics, the Legal System, and the Students
Caught in the Middle, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 301 (2012); Schneider & Hanna,
supra note 43, at 344–45.
80
See generally Lois H. Kanter, V. Pualani Enos & Clare Dalton,
Northeastern’s Domestic Violence Institute: The Law School Clinic as an
Integral Partner in a Coordinated Community Response to Domestic
Violence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 359 (2001).
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law school and the community. Through advocacy, education,
research in the community, and representation of women in
violent relationships, the Institute provided legal education in
which learning and understanding of law proceeded from
students’ immersion in and reflection on the social world of
women who experienced abuse and the legal institutions and
practices established to address that abuse. Through the
educational structures of the Institute, students could learn to
identify the implicit and explicit images of women in violent
relationships, compare those images to their clients’ experiences
and understandings, and challenge the ways that the law and the
legal system operate to cast women in violent intimate
relationships as victims lacking in knowledge and judgment
about their lives. They could engage in forms of legal practice
that made options for acting beyond the limited possibilities
enshrined in the legal process available to their clients. As with
all that Clare did, the power of the Institute’s approach came
from its engagement with others in a collective effort to
transform law, legal institutions, and lawyering through feminist
thought and action.
As Clare was developing the Institute at Northeastern,
clinical faculty—like feminist faculty—were challenging
traditional visions of law, as well as forms and methods of legal
education.81 Concepts and approaches shaped by these two
overlapping groups of faculty drew on similar themes.82 The
Domestic Violence Institute belonged to both projects.
Proceeding from the early work of Clare and those in clinical
education, the pedagogical structures and practices of such
81

Ann Shalleck & Muneer Ahmad, Clinical Thought: Investigating the
Contours, Urges and Trajectories (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author); AN ORAL HISTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, PART I: SEEDS
OF CHANGE (2006).
82
See generally Goldfarb, Theory-Practice Spiral, supra note 38.
Feminists explicitly brought together clinical theory and feminist theory
regarding domestic violence. See Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without
Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of
Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582 (1996); Ann Shalleck,
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clinics now aim to generate understanding of how law,
lawyering, and legal institutions can both create possibilities for
remedying harms to women who experience abuse, and also
constrain how law and society address the experiences of
domestic violence.83 In the educational activities of the Institute,
as in other domestic violence clinics, students’ understanding of
law grows from relationships with women struggling with the
ambiguities in and complexity of their relationships with others.
As advocates for these women, students learned to incorporate
into client representation the possibilities of using law to help
women address violence in their relationships, while recognizing
its many problematic and harmful dimensions. In their
representation and their other work in the community, students
encounter the distortions and limits of law in individual cases
and in systemic practices. They see how law can force a woman
into leaving an intimate partner, even if that action poses
dangers she understands better than others. They also learn how
law can require a woman to cooperate in seeking incarceration
fir a partner, even if jail harms all members of her family, or
can fail to secure the most basic forms of immediate help with
jobs or income at a time of grave danger. With this
understanding of law, students learn to expand their vision of the
work of the lawyer to include engagement with institutions in
the community that can be resources for individual women and
can be important in creating systemic change.84
83

See Goodmark, supra note 79, for an analysis of how feminist thought
and practice about domestic violence are reflected in this form of legal
education. See Schneider & Hanna, supra note 43, for a discussion of the
evolution of feminist approaches to violence against women since Clare and
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Clare made the Institute her central priority at the moment of
transition not just from Harvard to Northeastern, but from
institutional rejection to approval, and from a focus on doctrinal
formulations to law in the context of the world of legal practice
and social life. In her development, she expressed the central
commitments that had guided her work since she wrote about
contract doctrine: “how we should conceive relationships
between people, how we should understand and police the
boundary between self and other.”85 She wrote about how the
“inherent indeterminacy”86 of law and legal argumentation can
reveal these issues but cannot resolve them, and how we need to
“reflect directly on the concrete aspects of social life that create
the disputes and shape their resolution.”87 At all the critical sites
within the legal academy, she integrated these commitments into
her work.
As a feminist legal academic, Clare experienced the
importance of connection to other feminists and to feminism.
She understood the different aspects of her work—as a scholar, a
teacher, and a designer of curriculum—to be part of the task of
feminist transformation of legal understanding, legal practice,
and legal education. In the realm of legal scholarship, her
writing helped to enrich the legal inquiry of feminist academics
and to make the scholarly enterprise more inclusive of and
accessible to all women. With each use of her work by others,
her writing validated the importance of the development of
feminist thought to all legal thought. But the very success of her
article on contract doctrine exhibited the reality that individual
achievement on its own will not bring about change. Merit alone
could not secure tenure in a world of structural discrimination.
However, the fruits of her battle against that discrimination
through her litigation against Harvard secured the funding for a
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207, 211–13 (1992); Susan Bryant & Elliott Milstein,
Reflections Upon the 25th Anniversary of The Lawyering Process: An
Introduction to the Symposium, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2003); Gerald P.
Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially
Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989).
85
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86
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Domestic Violence Institute based on feminist understanding,
constructed with other feminists and supported by an institution
in which feminism could flourish. Her own life thus reflected
her analysis of the lives of other women who had sought
professional fulfillment in worlds within which women were
subordinate.88 Clare wrote that women needed to remain
cognizant of “the professional commitment to meritocracy as
containing a substantial element of window-dressing.”89 She
therefore cautioned that women should
not accept the invitation to reinterpret experiences of
prejudice and discrimination as experiences of personal
inadequacy. They should not imagine that superperformance
will be an amulet against such experiences. They should
not accept the argument that women “choose”
subordinate professional roles . . . without attention to
the way these “choices” are culturally constrained.90
In the multiplicity of its meanings, Clare’s contract article
reminds us that even today, more than twenty-five years after its
publication, feminist legal thought has an ambiguous and unstable
place in the legal academy, simultaneously honored and
marginalized, always in need of grounding in feminist support
and action. Just as Clare urged, feminist legal academics continue
to engage in collective effort not just to inhabit but to transform
legal thought and legal education. Absent this grounding, Clare
warned that women will be “stopped short of their full
potential.”91 When they can “locate the problem firmly outside
themselves,” however, and can feel “comfortable working
politically with other women and sympathetic men, to combat the
forces arrayed against them,” they will not have to bear the
“personal cost” of the “denial of some of the realities of their
lives.”92 With her guidance, feminist academics continue to build
on the legacy that Clare explicitly and munificently bequeathed to
them. They work in virtually every area of law both to continue
88
89
90
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to elaborate the meaning of feminist legal theory in all its
diversity93 and to bring insights from feminist analysis to realms
of legal education still resistant to feminist questions.94
CONCLUSION
As we honor Clare’s work with this symposium on
Challenging Boundaries in Legal Education, we see the
trajectory of feminists and feminism in the legal academy. We
identify the moments when Clare, always along with others,
created new visions of law and legal education and new
practices to make those visions real. Feminist academics, along
with those from other critical traditions,95 have brought about
something of a renewal of legal education. While partial,
tentative, and fraught with contradictions, the multiple changes
in legal education and broad discussion of the exciting
possibilities96 emerged in their current form largely because of
the efforts of committed academics—feminists prominent among
them—to remake the entire culture of legal education. This
transformation creates not just possibilities for richer and more
93

See, e.g., Baer, supra note 38, at 252 (discussing feminist approaches
to German jurisprudence); Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, supra note 38,
at 829 (identifying and critically examining feminist practical reasoning and
consciousness-raising and describing the concept of positionality); Burk,
supra note 38, at 185 (arguing that the feminist theory of oppositional pairs
may show how intellectual property law contributes to determining and
maintaining a pervasive set of power relationships in society); Littleton,
supra note 38, at 1285 (describing the feminist legal scholars’ reaction to the
civil rights movement and sexual equality); Paetzold, supra note 38, at 713–
14 (applying feminist ideas to business law).
94
See JUDITH G. GREENBERG, MARTHA L. MINOW & DOROTHY E.
ROBERTS, MARY JO FRUG’S WOMEN AND THE LAW (3d ed. 2004); see also
sources cited supra note 38.
95
Critical legal studies and clinical theorists have been the most
prominent, although her work also intersects with that of law and society and
critical race theory.
96
The vibrancy of both the critiques of legal education and the
possibilities for change are captured most recently and prominently in
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007).
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engaged educational experiences, but also for a legal profession
and a society that can deploy law better to address
“commitments and concerns central to our society.”97

97

Dalton, supra note 3, at 1009.

